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Whatever is intelligible is translatable. Whatever is intelligible is by definition subject 
to externalisation, and whatever is subject to externalisation is by definition subject to 
translation. 
PREFACE 
The paper constitutes a prolegomena, a framework, or a 
scaffolding for a theoretical understructure of the 
phenomenon of translation, seeking to articulate what it 
is and what  it is not, what it could be and what it could 
not possibly be.  In its internal weave, translation is a 
complex, rich, and varied phenomenon, and in its 
external function, it is a life-giving, life-affirming, life-
nourishing, bridge-building, bridge-repairing, barrier-
breaching, breach-filling globalising, synergizing 
humanising exercise. Much like language itself, which, 
in its internal architectonics, is such a rigorously 
elegantly rule-governed, complex, rich, varied, thought-
facilitating and mental-world creating enterprise and in 
its external function, is such a life-giving, life-creating, 
light-creating, light-giving, knowledge-building and -
giving, civilization-building, evolutionary 
enlightenment-targeting, Self-building socially 
phenomenon of translation is beginning to be available 
in the literature in the form of Clifford (1997), Giridhar 
(2005) and Singh (2004) inter alia. One such miscued 
shot (by Quine) has been successfully caught, among 
others, by Dasgupta (1989). On the positive side, of 
course, one needs to talk of how and why the place of 
translation is secure in the history of ideas, how it is 
such a powerful, life-giving, life-nourishing act and to 
explore how -- while it creates conditions for 
globalisation -- it pulls the lid off, sustains and fosters 
the important differences that mask the essential 
equally important grounding sameness of us as human 
beings. Without assuming an air of completeness or 
finality, the present paper will attempt to accomplish 
this, in terms of examining the sites of literary 
translation and expository knowledge-translation.  If 
poetry is untranslatable, we need to see why. We need to 
elucidate the dynamics, mechanics and the source of the 
element of ‘unself-identicality’ that inheres in the 
transcendent original. One reason why poetry is 
untranslatable is that while being transcendental, the 
original is arguably not self-identical (Sarukkai 2001). 
As we argue, it is difficult however to see how discursive 
texts are not self-identical. An automobile manual, for 
instance.  If, as we argue, all intelligibility is necessarily 
subject to translation, then whatever is intelligible 
including poetry must be translatable. Is it the case that 
intelligibility works at cross purposes with a text being 
not self-identical, with the nonself-identicality of these 
texts?  In any case we need a theory of semantic 
competence/performance, a theory that is diacritical of 
a principled dichotomy between grammatically 
determined meaning and extragrammatically 
determined meaning, something that Chomsky failed to 
do with any success (Cf Katz 1980). To deny the 
existence of extragrammatically determined meaning 
may be presumptuous. We are nowhere near a theory 
or explanation of such extragrammatically designed 
worlds in literary cosmoses despite a long hoary bequest 
in poetics that man has been heir to. One needs such a 
theory partly to explain the fact that (literary) originals 
are not absolutely self-identical, an insight first noticed 
by Benjamin (1923).     
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synergising exercise.  I am not sure if translation is best 
seen as a cluster concept, or that the definitional thrust 
of translation should be an open one. One needs to do 
some sorting, taxonomising and modularising, in case 
and after it is accepted as an open-ended cluster. The 
present exposition will claim that it is necessary to pin 
down things in any credible academic discipline before 
it endeavours to elucidate the place translation has in 
the history of ideas. There is doubtless some epistemic 
muck attached to translation at present in regard to 
how it relates to language, bearing on questions of 
translatability and untranslatability, and equally 
importantly, on how it is conceived as an academic 
discipline. One characterisation of this muck in relation 
to literary translation is ‘prescriptive anti-essentialism’. 
Except for a few people like the redoubtable 
Wittgenstein who made sublime sense while taking 
about  language, quite a few other non-linguists (e.g 
Derrida, Tejaswini Niranjana, Quine, Steiner, Eco and 
some others ) have been remarkably off-target in what 
they think about language. They have either overshot 
the target or missed it by nearly a mile. It is necessary 
in the interest of the pursuit of truth to outlast, and 
move beyond, them. Some hint of the untenability of 
such naive and theoretically uninformed postures about 
the nature of language and the nature of the 
GSTF Journal on Education (JED)
DOI: 10.5176/2345-7163_3.2.80
Print ISSN: 2345-7163, E-periodical: 2345-7171 ; Volume 3, Issue 2; 2016 pp. 23 - 39 
© The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access by the GSTF.
| GSTF Journal on Education (JED) Vol.3 No.2, August 2016
| GSTF Journal on Education (JED) Vol.3 No.2, August 2016
| GSTF Journal on Education (JED) Vol.3 No.2, August 2016
23 | GSTF Journal on Education (JED) Vol.3 No.2, August 2016
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
In some of its sundry areas, translation as a 
phenomenon has not been perspectivised as well as it 
could or should have been. This paper will attempt to 
elucidate and objectively correlativise this intuition in 
some of its ramified facets and phases. It will in 
particular  
 clear away some cognitive clutter, some
epistemic muck that attaches to translation
in its interface with language.
 address the triangular space between man,
translation and culture.
 try in a less definitive, less complete, more
ruminative way to technicalise or cerebralise
the distinction between discursive-discourse
translation and human-discourse translation,
between knowledge-translation and literary
translation, an important consequence of
which is that the site is thrown open for a
mulitiplicity of translations in the one and
not in the other. This is prior to elucidating
other ramified consequences that this
distinction could lead to, hazarding the
possible lines and contours of the site of
literary translation, the meeting ground of
two sociocultural ethoses in the light of what
has transpired on the site i.e. what mediative
negotiative appropriative, exppropriative
conflictive osmotic struggles, battles,
skirmishes, blood transfusions, and
exchanges have taken place on the site.
2.0 THE DEFINITIONAL IMPULSE 
One needs to remember that when one is talking 
about translation, the analysis definitely proceeds 
from language. There is no translating the blank 
page, the absence of the linguistic word, is there? On 
the other hand, one could obviously talk about 
translation without talking about language at all. In a 
word, we can’t translate the blank page i.e the 
absence of language: we need language although we 
needn’t talk about language while discoursing about 
translation! We need language to talk about non-
language as translated. This is a situation where one 
needs x although x need never be the topic of 
discourse, although x is possibly considered not 
worthy of attention. Why do we need x? We need it 
for us to be able to talk about non-x made possible by 
x. Incidentally, the very fact that one could talk
about nonx without talking about x in any sense, the
x that in fact carries non-x, is an eloquent comment
on the separability of x and non-x.  This important
aspect of the language-nonlanguage interface we will
have occasion to discuss as we progress below.   
2.1 When one says ‘every translation is a translation 
of a translation of a translation’ or when one says ‘I 
am a translated being’  or ‘(original) creative 
literature is also translation’, or “If translators are 
readers of the source text that they translate, scientists 
are readers of the ‘book of nature’ which they then 
translate.”  (the last by Sarukkai (2001) taking the 
cake), one is talking of a sense of ‘translation’ which 
is different from the sense one means usually when 
one talks, let’s say, of the Kannada translation of 
Macbeth or the Hopi translation of the novel ‘A 
Hundred Years of Solitude’.  The claim is that while 
translation could be a cluster concept across cultures, 
for comments on which see below, in an academic 
discipline, notions must have some definably 
technical charge. The argument is that modularity is 
the best way to pursue knowledge unless there is 
proof to the contrary. There is something seriously 
wrong if we are to say in regard to  
1. Tom and Benjamin are translated
beings.
    and 
2. Tom and Benjamin have translated
Uncle Tom’s Cabin into Gikuyu.
the meaning of the lexeme ‘translate’ is the same 
because of what have been called ‘family 
resemblances’. One needs to examine the two uses 
separately, in a modular fashion before arriving at a 
decision. There are any number of obvious 
differences between the two. For starters, Tom and 
Benjamin in sentence 1 may be congenital deaf-
mutes, whereas that can’t be the case in sentence 2. 
Which is to say language is necessarily involved in 
the latter while it need not be in the former. What the 
translation is from and into is not clear in (1), while it 
is in (2). Such differences are solid enough to 
actualise a difference in kind.  
Notice that the above mix-up has nothing to do with 
culture. What follows is a discussion of translation as 
it is culturally coloured and configured. Prima facie it 
is less of a muddle if TS allows culturally configured 
differences in the definition of translation.  The 
submission even here however is that the grounds for 
saying that the differences that do exist between 
cultures as regards how they view translation are not 
as irreducible as they appear, are not as irreducible as 
the Tourian definition of translation of “any target 
language text which is presented or regarded as such 
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within the target system itself, on whatever grounds” 
(Toury 1982) suggests. I mean it is difficult to 
conceive for example an ethos which considers 
interlinguistic transmission of an automobile manual 
as anything other than transmission of bare 
information. At the least one of the possibilities of 
interlinguistic translation of an automobile manual 
for instance must be the culture-neutral transfer of 
bare denotative information: cognitive translation or 
translation of what has been called ‘cognitive texts’, 
discursive texts as opposed to human texts, is clearly 
on a completely different footing. Otherwise the 
dissemination, secularisation and democratisation of 
knowledge, which are universally acknowledged to 
be among the functions of translation, which in fact 
give translation its place in the history of ideas, 
would be empirically vacuous claims.  There is 
something seriously wrong if a translated legal 
document is allowed to be coloured by cultural 
intervention, allowed to be manipulated by agendas 
except solely in pursuit of the eternal human values 
of freedom, equity, justice. Or if a non-communal 
literary piece is given a communal colour in 
translation.  Or a non-carnal piece is carnalised. The 
Igbo word for translation means ‘deconstruct and 
narrate’. I would be surprised if the Igbo translation 
of a manual on geriatric care would mean deconstruct 
it and rewrite it the way one wants. This can not be. 
And should the internationalisation of translation 
studies, one wonders, mean  ‘cultural self-definition’ 
and ‘self-representation’ of this kind. My submission 
is that there is the phenomenon of interlinguistic 
transmission of embodied linguistic texts and human 
groups may have their own valid culturally 
configured  definitions, definitions, as Tymzscoko 
(2005) avers, that allow various cultures  to identify 
factors that enter into their decisions to identify 
certain phenomena as translations and reject others as 
not translations, the types of correlations there are 
between these identifications and other cultural 
processes and products, the correlations there are 
between such determinations and social conditions, 
and the like.  There could be mode 1 of interlinguistic 
transmission, mode2, mode 3, mode 4 and so on 
within the culture. If the processes and products these 
modes entail are perceptibly different, then there is 
no meaning in saying there is only one concept called 
‘translation’ and we have a cluster definition of this 
concept so as to accomodate how every human ethos 
views it. I am, in other words, submitting that for 
each of these modes that have their own definably 
obvious diacritics, the definitional impulse must 
mean closure.  
There are two things: 
a. the noncultural mix up and
b. the cultural mix up
In the first of the above, the definitional route must 
meet a dead-end for the various senses of the word 
‘translate’ discussed above, as exemplified in 
utterances like  
a. I am a translated being.
b. Life is a translation.
c. Original writing is a translation.
d. I have translated my weaknesses into
strengths.
e. He couldn’t translate his dreams into
reality.
f. I have translated music into painting.
g. Scientists read the ‘book of nature’  and
then translate it.
h. My wife is my translation.
i. All my kids are faithful translations of
me.
j. All my friends are my translations of
my ideas.
k. I have translated my talent into cash.
l. The world is a translation of God by
God.
m. Will the turn-out at the rally translate
into votes?
n. Mona has translated Moby Dick into
Moyon Naga.
o. We should help translate scientific and
technological advancements into
innovative and affordable technologies
and health solutions
(This is the goal of the Translational Health Science 
and Techonology Institute(THSTI) of the Dept of 
Biotechnology of the Government of India)  
At the least it must mean closure for the sense in n) 
above as against the rest viz a) to m)and o). In the 
second namely the cultural mix-up, each of the 
modes of interlinguistic transmission viz, translation, 
adaptation, original writing, paraphrase, summary, 
inspired original creation, intersemiotic transmission 
must mean closure across cultures. This tack is what 
would facilitate epistemology. Culture x has this 
mode or modes of interlinguistic transmission and 
culture y has the other mode or modes and so on. But 
these modes are defined cross-culturally. The take in 
a culture that views x as translation and y as 
nontranslation while there is a culture that views the 
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same x as nontranslation and the same y as 
translation is suspect  in as much as its 
epistemological spin-offs are suspect.    In illustrative 
terms, what does it mean to say the concept of 
translation in India meant ‘rewriting’ and this view is 
different from the Western view?  
What it means epistemologically is that there can’t be 
any across-the-board examination of this 
phenomenon called translation simply because 
because of internal cultural processes, what is called 
translation in culture x is not considered translation in 
culture y. What is ‘adaptation’ for you is ‘translation’ 
for me and what is ‘translation’ for you is ‘rewriting’ 
for me and what is ‘transcreation’ for you is ‘original 
creation’ for me, what is ‘translation’ for me is 
‘original creation’ for you, what is ‘inspired creation’ 
for me is ‘translation’ for you  and so on. Then we 
could only have cultural-internal investigation into a 
muddle called ‘translation’. If everything is 
translation, nothing is translation. Everything about 
translation is then culture-determined, the sociology, 
the ontology, the philosophy, the phenomenology, the 
politics, the neurophysiology, the linguistics etc. of 
translation. One wonders if this is okay. If this 
reveals deep insights into how a culture organizes 
itself, it could make sense. Otherwise, a blanket 
culture-specificity of the phenomenon of translation 
is suspect as this piece has repeatedly tried to assert. 
This needs looking into. It is not that simple.     
It must be a culture-free axiom of translation qua 
phenomenon for example that translation is a 
‘decisional act of ethical responsibility’, as indeed are 
all products of human consciousness. The 
resemblances in sentences (1) and (2) above and 
sentences (3) and (4) below 
3. His words never translate into action
4. I translated my weaknesses into
strengths 
are to be sure not fortuitous at some level of the 
etymology and history of the word ‘translation’, but 
they belong for sure to different orders, to different 
planes of existence. So that to consider them 
manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon 
would lead us up and astray upon an epistemological 
and ontological garden path.   
2.2 MISCONSTRUALS 
There are numerous misconceptions and 
misconstruals because people turn a blind eye to the 
aspect of translation that has to do with language. 
(My commentary on these would have a reining-in 
effect on the implications of centrifugality, 
nonstability and evanescence that the fact that the 
transcendent original is not self-identical implies). 
This is despite a Catford or a Nida or a  Roger Bell if 
you will, who have done significant work on what 
may be called the ‘Linguistics of Translation’. Even 
Catford is guilty of nontruisms: for example, he 
claims that a sentence in language x has a meaning 
that belongs uniquely to language x. This is not true 
or cannot be true, pace what postmodernists and other 
literary cognoscenti think. It is much like saying x 
has a hand or a leg which is uniquely different from 
the rest of humankind.  
Suppose there is a set of objects, say, a, b and c,pre-
systematically and pre-analytically unrelated, but 
found empirically to have the following 
characteristics: 
i. a, b and c  have the properties x, y and z.
ii. a has the feature d.
iii. b has the feature  e.
iv. c has the feature  f.
v. neither a nor b nor c has, or, more
importantly, can have the feature g
The empirical fact mentioned at v above leads to the 
conclusion that a, b and c are the same at an 
important level. They belong to the same class 
existentially, ontologically and epistemologically. 
They share the same ontology at an important and 
deep level of their existence, although their manifest 
superficial shapes may be different. 
      a, b and c are the class of human 
languages.  
This fact allows us to make a number of deductive 
essentialist statements about human languages. 
Deductively speaking, certain word orders are not 
possible and certain rules are not possible, there 
being an existent and a non-existent core to language 
that is largely changeless. While there is no particle 
of evidence that linguistic structure is a cultural 
artefact, which fact is in fact what makes for the 
above-mentioned sameness of human languages, at 
some level of their existence, there is neither doubt 
nor debate that the lexical cosmos of a speech 
community is culturally driven. And that at this level 
the relationship between cognition and experience is 
culturally specified. While this cultural origin of 
lexical items could be adduced to say languages at 
some level are ‘native’, ‘original’ and ‘specialised’ 
evolutions of the human capacity to think and create 
mental worlds, it is necessary to realise that this 
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cultural distinctiveness is obviously a subset of the 
larger set of human cognition, which every human is 
biologically equipped with. Which is to say no 
speaker of any language can claim that the 
conceptual constructs that her language has 
linguisticised are not intelligible, and if they are 
unintelligible, cannot be made intelligible, to 
speakers of other human languages. If this is true, as I 
think it is, this is only a step away from saying that 
whatever is expressible in any language is expressible 
in any other language. This is of course subject to 
provisos of interlinguistic translation that could well 
be made explicit: the ‘untranslatability’ of sound, of 
puns, rhymes and alliteration, for example, which are 
functions of linguistic sound, the ‘untranslatability’ 
of grammatical dynamics, of metaphoricity, 
idiomaticity and so on. The locution 
‘untranslatability’ is in quotes because we don’t think 
some of such much-ballyhooed ‘untranslatability is 
as significant as some people make it out to be.    
3.0 ALLEGED UNTRANSLATABLES 
Examples of phonologically driven feedback to 
linguistic or rhetorical effect (not ‘meaning’) are: 
1. If you want tea badly you will get bad
tea here.
2. the clutter of rattling cutlery.
3. If you are on fire, you can put the world
on fire.
4. I will treat you to some treated drinking
water.
5. I was a mysogynist. But over the years,
I have softened to have a soft corner for
the softer sex!
6. dil churaake   aankh na churaawoo.
heart    steal-cnj eye  neg steal-imp
  ‘having stolen my heart, don’t avoid eye-
contact (lit. don’t steal eyes)’ 
7. Big Ben to the Tower of Pisa: If you
have the inclination, I have the time.
  ... 
Differential grammatical dynamics is illustrated by 
sentences like the English 
 I am bereaved. 
and their possible translations in Indian languages, 
where, unlike in the instant English sentence, the 
topic of discourse must per force not be ‘I’, and 
where the relationship of the dier and the speaker of 
the sentence has per force to be made explicit, which 
is not the case in the English sentence. 
It is also illustrated by the Urdu couplet of 
aap ban gayii tum 
tum ban gayi tuu 
the English translation of which would be arguably 
inelegant if it is  
you (the honourable stranger) 
became  you (the dear one) 
and you (the dear one) became  you 
(the dearest one) 
and downright laughable if it is 
 you1 became you2 
 and you2 became you3 
aap in Urdu means ‘you (pl or sg honorific)’, tum
means ‘you (pl or if sg less honorific than aap) and 
tuu means ‘you (sg)’. It is there for all to see that 
English with the formal monopartiteness of its second 
person pronoun pales into a vapidity that is 
inexpressive, colourless and inelegant in a non Euro-
Atlantic trans-linguistic perspective.  This needs to be 
admitted, notwithstanding the (valid) thesis that 
whatever experiential or cognitive expanse has found 
expression in any natural language is necessarily 
subject to expression of some kind in another natural 
language.     
Some translations, while being equivalent because of 
identity of meaning, may not have equivalent effect. 
As we saw, phonologically contrived feedback to 
semantic effect (‘meaning’ may not be the word to 
use here) cannot be carried across. The following 
illustrates untranslatability caused by a combination 
of sound and grammatical dynamics:  
My brain has two parts: the left and the right. There 
is nothing right   about the right part and as for the 
left, there is nothing left!     
Interlinguistic translations of this passage into 
languages in which there is no such resonant 
interplay between the two ‘right’s and the two ‘left’s 
could be argued to be vapid. But to say that the 
original passage is not translatable into such 
languages does not hold water. One could even argue 
that the effect of such interplay between linguistic 
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expressions is but merely cosmetic, not really 
substantial, really outside the life-blood of life 
experience. It is said that the greatness of all great 
poetry is locked up in the source language. It is also 
said that “poetry is by definition untranslatable” 
Jakobson (1959) 1989:59-60). This, as Chesterman 
points out, is linked to the equivalence supermeme 
viz no ‘translation that is not totally equivalent is a 
translation.”  Both positions viz that the greatness of 
all great poetry is locked up in the SL or that poetry 
is by definition  untranslatable, need to be seen in 
perspective: Clearly part of this greatness is driven by 
the phonologically contrived feedback to linguistic 
effect. To the extent that such sound-motivated effect 
as pointed out is outside the life-blood of non-
linguistic experience, or can hardly be said to be 
reflective of the essence or the substantive core of 
non-linguistic experience, the alleged 
untranslatability of (at least part of) such greatness is 
not a big deal, so to speak. And as we repeatedly 
stress in this piece, there is nothing that a human 
group does that another human group can’t 
understand---because all human biological form is 
essentially the same and as a consequence the nature 
of cognition of all human groups is essentially, 
foundationally the same. There is nothing 
sociohistorical or sociocultural  about this. The non-
DNA factors that play a role in human evolution 
can’t substantially alter this, rendering what a human 
group does totally esoteric, inscrutable and 
impermeable to another group. In fact, the thesis that 
the greatness of all great poetry is inalienably part of 
the source language, too strong a thesis, could be one 
form of what could be called the irrational 
‘fetishisation’ or ‘valorisation’ or veneration of the 
‘sacred’ original.  On the other hand, there seems to 
be no reason for saying the original is sacred in a SL-
TL perspective. On what basis does one say the 
original is sacred in comparison with the translation? 
Because it came into being before its translation did? 
A fifty-year old is more sacred than a forty-year old 
because the former landed on earth before the latter? 
On what basis could we say the father is more sacred 
than the son? That the original is somehow ‘better’ 
than its translation is also reflected in Corpus 
Linguistics, where it is believed that translations are 
less natural than their originals and therefore not to 
be counted as textual corpora. This is intriguing.  The 
following Kannada sentence 
   kelasa  pragatiyallide 
 work-nom  progress-loc-be-tns-
sn 
as the pervasive and putative translation of the 
English  
   work in progress 
is not natural, although it is structurally felicitous. 
The natural parallel in Kannada of this English 
sentence is  
  kelasa          naDita      ide. 
  Work-nom    walk-cont  be-
tns- 
 “Work is on.” 
The question that corpus linguists should ask is 
whether the translated natural parallels in the TL 
should or should not constitute legitimate data. The 
answer to this question cannot be negative. The point 
is that such utterances occur naturally anyway in TL, 
although they materialise as responses to the SL 
sentence in the enterprise of translation. On the other 
hand, if the parallels are structurally, systemically 
felicitous even when they are not exactly ‘natural’, 
they ARE legitimate, aren’t they?  
 4.0 TEMPORAL PRECEDENCE AND 
SACREDNESS 
A thought-movement is more sacred than another 
thought-movement simply because the former 
happens to be older than the latter?  Does that make 
sense? Even otherwise, there is nothing sacred in any 
human group except as defined by the internally, 
organically related axiological triad of freedom, 
equity, justice. In point of fact, the only thing sacred 
that one needs to be religiously after in any human 
group is this non-anthropomorphic non-divine deity 
called FEJ: freedom, equity, justice. Only FEJ should 
overarch and hold communitarian sway among 
humans, nothing else even while societies ought to 
respect individual beliefs and convictions that could 
well be irrational, undebatable, unfalsifiable and 
unproveable, but from which individuals derive 
mental, spiritual  and emotional sustenance,  and 
which are, or should be, strictly confined to private 
spaces.  (In other words, ( privately professed and 
practiced) religions ought not to be banned by the 
state.) Under the overarching moral sky, or the 
blanket ethical sun, of the axiological triad broached 
above, the rational felicitousness, soundness and 
efficacy of ideas, of the memes of human intellection, 
and the human behaviour that such ideas and memes 
delightfully and inexorably drive in a society,  are 
what are paramount in any human group, nothing 
else.    
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4.1 IDIOMATICITY, METAPHORICITY AND 
LITERARY ’MEANING’ 
Translations of expressions that are metaphorical and 
idiomatic in the source language, to get back from the 
excursion in the above paragraph, could sound vapid 
in target languages where the equivalents are per 
force non-metaphorical. The following exemplify this 
I need to ratchet up my life. 
One wants a girl/boy one can breathe into 
one’s soul. 
Brenda is broad-in-the-beam. 
Merwyn is epigamous. 
It is raining cats and dogs in Koyoto 
What may be called ‘literary meaning’ is not quite 
translatable simply because languages are structured 
the way they are. 
Gazing up into the darkness, I saw myself as 
a creature driven and derided by vanity. 
is a sentence from Joyce’s short story ‘Araby’. A 
number of ‘literary’ meanings are said to emerge 
from the way the sentence is structured in English. 
The protagonist is sandwiched between the darkness 
above and the world inside, where the realization 
occurs.  
This is iconically reflected by the ‘stunning 
symmetry’ of the English linguistic structure of a 
main clause (viz. I saw myself) balanced on either 
side by a subordinate clause of five words each. (See 
Giridhar 1991). Such ‘literary’ meanings go per force 
unrendered in languages where subordinate clauses 
never follow the main clause.  
4.2 One is pleasantly  surprised when one 
finds some realisation in the literature on 
Translation Studies (TS) of what is a basic 
motif of this essay, i.e, that languages and 
cultures cannot be foundationally or totally 
or discontinuously or incurably different 
from one another. That even as the culturally 
configured differences that mask the 
similarities are interesting, so are the 
samenesses or the similarities that ground us 
humans as a species.   The following quote 
is from de Ward and Nida (1986), and it 
deals with culture: 
All peoples share more cultural similarities than is 
usually thought to be the case. What binds people 
together is much greater than what separates them. In 
adjustments to the physical environment, in the 
organisation of the society, in dealing with crucial 
stages of life (birth, puberty, marriage and death), in 
the development of elaborate ritual and symbolism, 
and in the drive for aesthetic expression...people are 
amazingly alike. Because of all this, translation can 
be undertaken with the expectation of communicative 
effectiveness 
 And, bang on target, the following from 
Benjamin (1923 [1979]:185) 
Translation thus ultimately serves the purpose of 
expressing the central reciprocal relationship between 
languages. ..Languages are not strangers  to one 
another, but, a priori, and apart from all historical 
relationships, interrelated in what they want to 
express 
has to do both with language and nonlanguage. 
Incidentally, most of the time thought-provoking, 
Benjamin’s celebrated 1923 essay also has 
unacceptable averrals. For example, the last sentence 
in the essay states that the interlinear version of the 
Scriptures is the prototype or ideal of all translation. 
One can’t think of any rational underpinning to this 
averral.  There is also the view that the view that the 
literal and the figural are opposed to each other and 
to accord primacy to the literal as opposed to the 
figural is a limited view of language (Sarukkai 2001). 
The questions this piece poses are:  
are the figural, nonliteral radiations out of 
the empirical linguistic objects as elusive, 
evanescent and unstable as people make 
them out to be? 
Are they really fugitive catch-me-if-you-can 
entities? 
I don’t think they are. They can’t be. The problem is 
people who say these things don’t take a real world 
linguistic object, an actual text or a sentence or a 
cluster of sentences and show us the soundness and 
efficacy of their beliefs and pronouncements. To that 
extent one doesn’t need to contest or engage them. 
On the other hand as we have argued in this piece, a 
theory of what is now thought extragrammatical 
extralinguistic senses that linguistic objects are 
deemed to carry, a theory of semantic 
competence/performance  is very much a 
desideratum.  Meaning that is a matter of language 
and meaning that is a matter of use or context of 
utterance need to be distinguished in a principled 
nonairy manner. Meaning that is grammatically 
29 | GSTF Journal on Education (JED) Vol.3 No.2, August 2016
P.P Giridhar
determined and meaning that is a cultural 
reconfiguration of a grammatical output. A clear 
example of these two is the following example from 
Kannada: 
A Kannadiga says 
       naanu  bartini  
i-nom   come-tns-1s
as he takes leave and the sentence literally means “I 
(will) come!” 
bartini ‘will come’ would mean a movement 
toward the listener, but in this case the 
speaker is moving away from the listener, 
but is still saying ‘I will come’. Further, this 
sentence with time and other adverbials 
doesn’t qualify to be called formal a leave-
taking linguistic ritual.  
The meaning of the utterance in this context viz. of 
leave-taking is a cultural or extragrammatical 
reconfiguration of a grammatically determined 
semantic output.     
I fully agree that while that the original is a statement 
of transcendence is not in doubt, its self-identity is 
(Sarukkai 2001). While the original is a transcendent 
reality in the sense it is at some level of its existence 
self-contained, formally separate from everything 
else, it is not absolutely self-identical. This is one 
reason one uses the word ‘equivalence’ rather than 
‘equality’. And I also agree with Sarukkai (2001) that 
“the original, beyond its primary objecthood, can 
only be given, whether it is a book, a painting, or the 
world, only through translation,  
and this fact of the original being in a state of 
transcendence without being self-identical gives a 
unique space to translation.”  It is also clear that that 
the original is not absolutely self-identical is what 
makes the space between the (literary) original and 
the translation a passage of philosophy. This is 
among the things that make translation as a 
phenomenon a paradigm for philosophy, in fact for a 
range of practices. A cogent piece of evidence that 
the literary original is not absolutely self-identical is 
the fact that back translations are typically not 
identical. A possible English translation of vibhUti, 
for example, of Kannada is ‘sacred ash’. The first 
back translation that comes to mind of ‘sacred ash’ is 
‘pavitravAda bUdi’, not vibhUti. If sea gull is 
translated as jal kawwa in Hindi, the first back 
translation of jal kawwa is not ‘sea gull’ but ‘water-
crow’. Note that this is typically true of lexical items, 
and not of syntactic structures. Equational sentences, 
for example, are equational sentences both ways. In 
other words, the nonself-identicality of texts has to 
do, not with the internal weave or build of natural 
languages, but with their lexical items. What this in 
effect means is that the nonself-identicality is not 
total but only partial.  
4.3 PHASES OF TRANSLATION 
The ‘linguistics of translation’ is of course not the 
only translation that there exists or there is to talk 
about. Far from it. As Tymoczko (2005) points out, 
on the other hand, the much ballyhooed ‘cultural 
turn’ or the ‘power turn’ are themselves 
circumscribed parts of this varied and complex 
phenomenon. There are various facets or faces or 
phases of the phenomenon of translation like the 
politics of translation, the sociology of translation, 
the axiology of translation, the epistemology of 
translation (of which this disquisition is an instance), 
the phenomenology of translation, the philosophy, 
the ethnography, the ontology of translation, the 
neurophysiology of translation and so on. In point of 
fact when one says meaning that escapes the code is 
no longer the same one is pointing to the existence of 
possibilities beyond strict linguistic equivalence, to 
code-allegiant, code-compliant rather than the 
objective nonlinguistic world-allegiant meaning. 
Translation as a manifest phenomenon can be clearly 
slotted into two foundational divisions viz. one where 
one necessarily deals with language and language-
based equivalence, and one where one need not talk 
about language at all even though one is talking about 
interlinguistic translation, translation which proceeds 
from one language and journeys into another. In the 
former the translator seeks to transmit bare 
information and so is best seen as a ‘technician’, a 
‘workman’ a ‘craftsman’.  and in the latter, bare 
information is not the end (by definition one doesn’t 
go to a literary piece to seek anthropological or other 
kinds of info, one does or expects other things in a 
literary piece) and hence the translator functions 
more than as a ‘technician’, translation in this case 
being a different kind of path-creation.  This path is 
more absorptive, accommodative, negotiative, 
mediative, conflictive and appropriative than 
knowledge–translation. At least, literary translation is 
mediative, negotiative, absorptive, accomodative, 
conflictive and appropriative in a way that 
knowledge-translation is not. This difference, we 
submit, is a function of the fact that the site of literary 
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translation is interactive and is pretty much a two-
way traffic unlike that of cognitive translation.     
5.0 THE CLUTTER 
Some examples of the clutter that was broached 
earlier: There are observations made as naive as the 
following: 
      How do you consider, someone could 
ask,  the translation of an English sentence 
like  
1. This is a book into a language like Kannada as
1a. idu pustaka 
      this-nom       book 
as translation because the copula and the article have 
gone unrepresented in Kannada, the TL. Who 
adjudicates this equation? Or worse, how does one 
consider as translation the translation of sentences 
with different word orders? The Kannada translation 
of a sentence like  
2. Kishore killed the king
viz. 
  2a.  kishoor  raajanannu    konda 
  Kishore-nom   king-acc   kill-
tns-3sm 
Only She (=a female goddess) knows how these are 
not translations or how these are theoretically a 
problem for interlinguistic translation. These clearly 
betray ignorance of the nature of natural languages. 
In particular, ignorance of a basic fact about natural 
languages viz. that languages are species-specific 
evolutions of the human capacity for thinking and for 
creating mental worlds and subsequently and in a 
sense, trivially truly, to communicate. Ignorance of a 
basic premise of interlinguistic translation viz. of 
structural equivalence. Sentences 1 and 1a and 
sentences 2 and 2a are structurally equivalent, the 
grammatical differences between them 
notwithstanding. As you can see, that someone has to 
declare the two ‘equivalent’ doesn’t make good sense 
atleast in such cases. They are perceived to be 
equivalent from a language-neutral position. People 
have also said this is ‘adaptation’. This is NOT 
adaptation or ‘transfer’. In adaptation, as should be 
used in Translation Studies, the translator’s agency is 
crucial -- unlike here, where the expressions in the 
target code suggest themselves. Typically, structural 
equivalents suggest themselves, without much 
mulling. When equivalents or a range of equivalents 
suggests itself, what it means is that there is 
something significantly more at work, viz. that there 
is a common level from which these structural 
templates and linguisticised meanings originated, 
diverged and grew formally apart. Or else: ‘on what 
basis do these suggest themselves as equivalents?’  is 
the question to ask and mull. Notice that this is not 
comparable, for example, to  
   4+5= 7+2 = 1+8... 
The multiple sides of the equation do not come from 
a unit at a more basic level as do cross-linguistic 
equivalents, which are, arguably or unarguably, 
superficial derivative variants of the same underlying 
reality.  However, the above mathematical equation 
signifies the fact the multiple arms of the equation are 
differential componential manifestations of a unitary 
rational number viz 7. There is no basic/derivative 
distinction in it as there is in the case of cross-
linguistic equivalents and their source. 
Whatever identity the equivalence is underpinned in 
– identity of meaning, of structure or of function -
must have common shared, system-driven, speaker-
free roots. Even in a case like finding the parallel of
the pleasant connotations of ‘summer’s day’ in the
Shakespearean
  Shall I compare thee to a summer’s 
day? 
in something like 
 Shall I compare thee to a spring’s 
day? 
or whatever, or when a Kannada translator finds the 
parallel of the English every Tom, Dick and Harry in
  every Sita, Gita and Gayatri 
it is a case not so much of the translator’s agency as 
the possibility that suggests itself in the target 
situaton, which could have to do with the translator’s 
competence in the language-pair. Translatorial action 
here is confined, restricted to the search for what 
already exists. The translator doesn’t create anything 
here. It is also said all translation entails some 
adaptability (cf. Classe 2000). In translating 
“journalism, tourist brochures, advertisement 
material and instruction manuals, adaptation is 
entirely a part of the translation process and tropes, 
names and text structure may be adapted to accord 
with the conventions of the target language.” (Classe 
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2000: p 2). I am not sure of the use of the word 
‘adaptation’ here. When such changes suggest 
themselves not so much with the translator’s agency 
as through the natural requirements of the target 
code, it should not be called ‘adaptation’ in 
Translation Studies. If this is the right sense of the 
word ‘adaptation’, then the word ‘adaptation’ needs 
to be given some technical charge. The suggestion 
here is that adaptation, as it should be understood in 
Translation Studies, occurs entirely due to the agency 
of the translator, and NOT as a function of the 
conventions of the target language. In which sense in 
point of fact it is distinctly different from what could 
be called ‘translation’.  
What happens in the case of  (literary) ‘translation’ is 
that while there is largely an attempt to accord with 
the conventions of the target language, a translator is 
clearly more than a mere ‘technician’. A literary 
translator ‘creates’ paths to a different cosmos that 
the other sociocultural ethos constitutes. This fact of 
the translator being more than a technician, of the 
translator being a ‘path-creator’ makes theoretical 
room for a churning to take place. There is this 
translating consciousness and the original author’s 
consciousness which meet in the interfacing cauldron 
or site called ‘translation’ and what issues from this 
non-real time face-to-face rendezvous or encounter is 
not entirely predictable. This unpredictability makes 
for theoretical room for a multiplicity of translated 
products, which is not the case in the case of 
cognitive translation. What however seems to be very 
much predictable is that the creative, life-giving, life-
nourishing, being-enhancing churn is what will make 
for the fact - which is what I have drawn attention to 
in the final paragraphs of this piece – that the new 
born is in a position to speak to the original, has 
evolved and grown naturally to be able to speak to 
the original. Which is something that you can’t say of 
a photocopy.  It also needs to be stressed that there is 
NO question of ‘transfer’. If there are differential 
structures or word orders such as SOV, VSO, head 
noun-adjective, adjective-head noun  and so on, it 
doesn’t make theoretical sense that we ‘transfer’ this 
SL structure to the TL one. What the translator does 
is to find out the parallel representation in the TL 
cosmos.  Given a foundationally similar cognitive 
apparatus that all of us humans are endowed with, 
and assuming that individual codes took divergent 
paths within what is possible for human biological 
form, translation has quitessentially to do with 
finding out matches of parallel representations, 
differently contexted simulacra, ‘constructing 
comparables’. Clearly, in their origin these linguistic 
codes didn’t take the ‘transfer’ route. To say that 
there was x structural or semantic path that some 
languages took, and other languages ‘transferred’ 
these to another structural and semantic 
configuration, is clearly wrong. These codes are, in a 
manner of speaking, originally different. It is thus 
incorrect to say English has SVO word order, and the 
translator ‘transfers’ this onto an SOV word order. 
The word ‘transfer’ in the case of interlinguistic 
translation is theoretically skewed.  For practical 
expedience however, as in MT, for example, one 
could use the word. But it makes no theoretical sense.  
Note that the above discussion rejects two things: 
a) the idea that equivalence is
‘produced’ by translation, that it doesn’t 
exist before. PAUL RICOUER. and   
b) that in translation one is dealing with
equivalence without identity. 
Further that, as paul Ricouer maintains, there is no 
third text to judge the translation as a set of 
equivalent parallels doesn’t merit extended comment. 
It is weird to think that we need a third party, a third 
text to sit in judgment on the equivalence question 
between two languages.    
6.0 To say that the relationship between a 
non-linguistic construct, a concept and its 
linguisticisation is arbitrary is to say what 
has already been said.  
There is a triadic typology of communicative signs: 
the picture of smoke is imitative and is an icon. 
Smoke the real-life object is an index of fire. An 
index is not imitative but is a natural extension of the 
signified. ‘smoke’ the English word is a symbol 
because it stands for something other than itself and 
has no smokiness about it. Symbol is neither an 
imitative nor a natural representation of its signified. 
Since there is no mutually reciprocal or logical or 
natural relation between the word ‘smoke’ and what 
it represents, since the word ‘smoke’ is outside the 
ontological domain of the object ‘smoke’ in the real 
world, it is possible to detach the word ‘smoke’ from 
what it represents and call it by different names in 
other languages. This is the crux of the possibility of 
interlinguistic translation. This said, however, one 
also needs to stress that ready-made  parallels in the 
TL may be difficult to come by for some SL 
expressions, which fact is a function of the fact that 
several thousand languages spoken on planet earth 
embed several different ways of looking at the 
universe. Such ready entities may not be there. But to 
say that the TL speaker can’t conceive what the SL 
expression means or/and that no parallel expression 
could be conceptualised and minted in TL are 
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positions difficult to take. The difficulty, not so much 
in conceptualising, but in phonic expression is an 
expression of the skewed character resulting from the 
differential configuration of expressive power that 
individual languages entail.  This fresh new minting 
from what is universally available to man, from the 
conceptually universal minting press  is in fact a great 
contribution of translation qua phenomenon to the 
expressive power, energy and wherewithal of the TL. 
As Rudolf Pannwitz (cited in Benjamin 1992:81) 
words it,   
The basic error of the translator is that he preserves 
the state in which his own language    happens to be 
instead of allowing his language to be powerfully 
affected by the foreign tongue...He must expand and 
deepen his language by means of the foreign 
language.   
7.0 THE INTELLIGIBILITY-
TRANSLATABILITY DIALECTIC 
There is another basic premise about interlinguistic 
translation that was elaborated on earlier, namely that 
intelligibility without translatability is not valid. Part 
of what this means is that if you know a linguistic 
object and the language in which it occurs, it follows 
that you will convert the one into a series of alternate 
linguistic objects.  If you know the word dharma for 
instance, and if you know the language in which it 
occurs, it follows that you should be able to elucidate 
the word in so many words, and if you know some 
other language to a definable extent, an interlinguistic 
translation should naturally follow. People have 
argued that knowledge and behaviour are different 
things and that if one knows a word it doesn’t 
necessarily follow that one should be able to ‘behave’ 
it, to put it across in so many words. I am not sure if 
this is okay. I am not sure if such knowledge can’t be 
goaded to a level of conscious awareness before 
being made to find linguistic utterance. All 
intelligibility is subject to externalisation and all 
externalisation to translatability. If one can 
externalise the meanings a word is pregnant with, via 
capturing the contextual variables that in fact make 
for the plurality of senses, a translation into any other 
language is very much on the cards. The inability to 
externalise the pregnancy is a distinctly different, 
albeit related, story! Admittedly, a long equivalent 
would dent the architecture and architectonics of the 
original so as to make the translation possibly 
laughable, but the important thing is to realise that 
the laughability issues from the skewedness that has 
to happen because the expressive power of languages 
is configured widely differently and delightfully 
diversely, for either genetic reasons or cultural. 
The translation may be long-winded, circuitous, 
awkward-sounding, etc. compared with the source 
language. But that is the way it is in that language. 
The Hindi jal kawwa (=water crow) for the English 
sea gull could be the paradigm example here. This is 
also an example of the difference in configuration of 
the expressive power of human languages. 
In a grammar I wrote, two subheadings were The 
people and The language. When we translated the 
grammar into the language which it is a grammar of, 
we couldn’t translate these expressions as they are in 
English. We had to do it in terms of the proper nouns 
instead of  the individuated common nouns. That is in 
fact what the English expressions meant in the 
ultimate analysis viz the proper nouns arrived at by 
the definite common nouns in a context. But the 
proper nouns themselves don’t surface in  English, 
which fact may be argued to be a  factor contributing 
to or constituting the aesthetic that may be said to 
animate the linguistic structure, the aesthetic being a 
function of the difference between how individuation 
or particularisation of noun phrases, the determiner-
phrases  operates in these two languages. This is lost 
in transition.   
The widely known Sanskrit word dharma could be 
taken as another illustration here and examined for 
what I am claiming. The untranslatability of this 
word has been mindlessly exaggerated. Contrary to 
what is putatively thought, the meaning of this word 
is pretty delimitable in various contexts. In the 
Kannada phrase dharma patni ‘dharma wife’ for 
instance it means only ‘legally wedded’. In 
application forms, it means only ‘religion’, and 
nothing else. In dharma chatra  ‘charitable 
community hall’, it means only ‘charitable’ and 
nothing else. In     
        hariyuvudu       nIrina        dharma 
        flow-ger-nom   water-gen   dharma 
       ‘flowing is water’s natural property’ 
the meaning of dharma is ‘natural property’ or 
perhaps ‘essential being’.  
It was A.L Basham who, in his The Wonder that was 
India, claimed that the word dharma is more pregnant 
with meaning than ‘righteousness’ could capture. 
This is not a terribly perceptive claim. And it was 
U.R Ananthamuthy, a distinguished thinker in the
Kannada world who once said that dharma doesn’t
mean ‘religion’. Nor is this a terribly perceptive
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claim. The meaning of any word in natural language 
is capturable by depicting the selectional affinities 
that the word displays in a sentence. These 
selectional affinities are captured in terms of the 
contextual variables that operate in sentences. We do 











idu nanna dharma. This 


















flowing is water’s 
natural 
property/essential being. 
dharma religion Application forms 
dharma legal weddedness dharma patni 
legally wedded wife 
dharma charitable dharma chatra 
charitable community 
hall 
dharma free; gratis idu dharmakke alla 
this is not for free 
The general claim is that although some nonlinguistic 
experience may not and does not lend itself to 
linguisticisation (eg. drug-induced visions, oracular 
experience, mystical experience etc), although the 
Barthesian characterisation of language as ‘prison-
house’ is right in a definable sense, all that has 
already found expression in language has to per force 
lend itself to interlinguistic translation, subject of 
course to limitations of interlinguistic translation 
which can be made explicit. Whatever is intelligible 
is translatable. Whatever is intelligible is by 
definition subject to externalisation, and whatever is 
subject to externalisation is by definition subject to 
translation.  
It is difficult to conceive the idea that the word 
dharma is unintelligibly unself-identical in the 
language in which it figures, even granting the thesis 
that lexical items are only prompts because the 
promptee worlds that words could trigger cannot 
appear from out of the blue. The element of nonself-
identicality of lexical items necessarily bears on the 
foundational oneness of all linguistic behaviour of a 
speech community, which in turn bears on the 
question of intelligibility. And once intelligible, it is 
externalisable and hence translatable.  If this is true, 
then the putative untranslatability of words like 
dharma into other human languages is seriously 
under question.      
8.0 THE LANGUAGE-CULTURE 
DIALECTIC 
Another conspicuous lack of awareness about 
language is about the way language relates to culture. 
It is pretty clear that language and culture are not 
inalienably contracted. There are several pieces of 
clear evidence, pointing to the fact that language and 
culture are NOT inalienably epoxied together. First, 
man has antedated language. Which is to say: the 
material from which linguistic meanings are forged 
existed well before language as a formal system came 
into being. Which is to say: the meaning material and 
the form it is encoded in are not simultaneous, 
although of course the chiselled meaning finally 
encoded in form and the form are simultaneous, and 
for purposes of thinking and creating mental worlds, 
and for communication need to be treated as though 
the relation between the two is not arbitrary. The two 
i.e. the meaning and the form came from different
directions before they were artificially put together.
In other words, meanings that attach to linguistic
form are detachable. Pace Saussure, they are not two
sides of a piece of paper. One can’t separate the two
sides of a piece of paper.
When one detaches or unwelds the two, some of the 
attachment may still stick with the detached part, in 
which case (part of) linguistic meaning is (formal) 
code-allegiant rather than concept-allegiant. 
Examples can be given here of connotations and 
other associational meanings and semantic effects 
that linguistic locutions carry. This could be the case 
when a person tends to use the words in the source 
language even though the meanings are pretty clear. 
Hence the tendency to use foreign expressions like 
quid pro quo, mutatis mutandis, per se, ipso facto, 
weltanschauung, mea culpa etc.  As Hermans (2002) 
points out, when the Jesuits tried proselytisation in 
China in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they 
needed to express very Western Christian concepts 
such as ‘god’, ‘heaven’, ‘soul’ and so on in Chinese 
P.P Giridhar
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and they found themselves up against a discursive 
stone wall. In Chinese, the only terms available to 
them were those that echoed Buddhist and Confucian 
usage. These were wholly incommensurate with the 
Christian message. The Jesuits, Hermans concludes, 
were greatly puzzled by their lack of success in 
China. We need to balance these two views, i.e. that 
there is nothing that language x expresses that the 
speakers of other languages can’t be receptive to, and 
that the foreignness of concepts and the consequent 
expressive askewness in cross-linguistic perspectives 
is something to reckon with, although not a really, 
desperately or incurably big deal.     
9.0 CODE-DEPENDENT MEANING 
A PhD student of mine studied the consequences of 
rendering a literary piece in Dalit Kannada (Kannada 
spoken by people living in the social backwaters) into 
standard Kannada. What we found was that although 
the world of the objective denotative meaning could 
be captured in Standard Kannada, there was 
something missing in it which may be attributed to 
what could be called ‘code-dependent’, ‘code-
allegiant’ or ‘code-driven’ effect (meaning?). This 
area is still murky and elusive. The possible truism 
that the meaning that escapes the code is no longer 
the same meaning belongs here. Is there anything 
more here than the basic fact that the internal 
varieties of language mark user-id (= dialects, 
regional and social), use-id (=registers or content-
oriented domains of discourse)) and situation id 
(=styles) ?  My own feeling is that this could be a 
more open question than some of us would like to 
believe. One simply doesn’t know. There could be a 
theory of the nonlinguistic meaning/effect that words 
carry in addition to those that grammars compute and 
output, which is what makes for the impossibility of a 
full interlinguistic  translation of a great poem. But 
such a viable and academically credible scaffolding 
for elucidating the dynamics of what makes for the 
untranslatability of the greatness of great poetry is 
still a desideratum. A theory that explains the 
aesthetic or poetic that may be said to animate 
linguistic structures in particular contexts of use 
needs to be in place. Such a theory, if and when 
successful,  could also be a formidable argument for 
a discretely different poetic language, the highest use 
of, the highest-resolution  hi-tech hi-serious, high-
definition exploration of, the resources of a natural 
language although admittedly even such a highly 
rarefied use of language would be well within the 
repertoire of all native speakers of that language.      
10.0 THE SPACE BETWEEN WORDS AND 
WHAT THEY MEAN 
Generally speaking, however, if objects in the non-
linguistic world may be said to have an ontology, 
then their linguistic expressions are clearly outside 
such ontology, much like externally pasted badges of 
identity that humans are enveloped by viz. religion, 
caste, nationhood etc. Secondly, any Chomskyan 
linguist would tell you that there are any number of 
principles underlying linguistic structure which have 
nothing to do with individual cultures, which have to 
do solely with culture-free human cognition. Thirdly, 
that what is called ‘translation’ is possible at all 
because of the separability of form and content in 
human language. Fourthly that particular 
sociocultural ethoses desire translations from other 
particular sociocultural ethoses, that for example, 
Malayalis (living in the south-western part of India) 
want more and more literary artefacts from Latin 
American literature translated into Malayalam has 
nothing to do with their language, Malayalam. 
Fifthly, that it is possible to break away from the 
cultures that particular languages encode is evidenced 
by literary pieces like Things Fall Apart, The Serpent 
and the Rope, etc. If one thinks that one cannot 
appropriate English to express one’s own sensibility, 
one has to concede that the two literary artefacts cited 
above encode two different and disparate 
sociocultural ethoses, i.e the Igbo and the Kannada 
ethos respectively, in addition to the English cultural 
ethos in a single unitary expressive vector. That claim 
is, as you can see, quite absurd. The proposal that 
when you use English for business purposes or for 
purposes which have nothing to do with the English 
culture that it is supposed to be a carrier of, you are 
still expressing English culture is on grounds 
comparable to quick-sand. It is clear at the very least 
that, being delightfully irrelevant, the idea that a 
particular code is expressive in such eventualities of 
an ‘inalienably, relevantly, inviolably sacred 
original’ culture falls by the wayside.  
11.0 THE TURNS 
As touched upon earlier in this paper, there is a face 
to translation that has nothing to do with language --- 
this although paradoxically all translation, intra- or 
interlinguistic, proceeds inescapably and inexorably 
from language, the thesis that this essay struck out 
with.  Rather it has to do with non-language that all 
human languages carry. That is in a sense much like 
creative literature, where one need not talk about 
language at all even though we are all the time 
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talking about literature that is embodied and realised 
in concrete language. In the former, one is essentially 
engaging in exercises in contrastive linguistics (this is 
the case with non-literary translation), whereas in the 
latter one goes far beyond to questions of the human 
creative urge to deal with larger questions of the 
human condition, man’s existence, his ontology, his 
identity, the sociocultural ethos  humans find 
themselves suspended in, and their relationship with 
it. This is the case when translation becomes the site 
where, much like creative literature, questions having 
to do with human existence and non-existence, 
human consciousness are raised, addressed, wrestled 
with and meditated on. Literary translation is a form 
of intercultural articulation, cross-cultural osmosis 
where the translated piece assumes a position from 
which it ‘speaks’ to the original. When a son 
effloresces and effervesces to attain a position from 
which he can ‘speak’ to the father, he is no longer a 
subordinate part of an identity of which the father’s is 
the dominant face. Although the son technically 
issues from the father, he has become unique, 
standing as he obviously can on an even keel with the 
father. This seems to be the most appropriate 
analogy. To say that the translation is as original as 
the original completely, culpably and successfully 
misses the point. If it is as original as the original, 
why should it be based on an original? This is the 
question nobody has answered and nobody can 
answer! Is it the case that the object in question can’t 
be ‘original’ except as a translation of an original!? A 
significant empirical fact is that PEN Translation 
Fund in the US says in case of equal merit of the 
original work and the translation, priority will be 
given to underrepresented authors and languages. For 
it there are nothing like   underrepresented 
translators.  
12.0 THE NONLANGUAGE ASPECT OF 
TRANSLATION  
This non-language aspect of Translation Studies as it 
obtains now is far from convincing and satisfactory. 
A considerable part of Translation Studies, as this 
field exists today, is highly subjective, imperceptive 
and non-rigorous. ‘Created fiction’ rather than 
rational discursive discourse occupies considerable 
space of the literary translation site. Any credible 
phenomenon of intellectual interest or philosophical 
depth must be governed by ideas of across-the-board 
genericity. Any viable phenomenon of any 
intellectual interest is driven and sanctioned by a grid 
of organising principles, by a network, by a 
sprawling network if you will, of taproots. A grid like 
that, a network of taproots needs to drive Translation 
Studies. There are empirically vacuous, 
meaninglessly redundant and theoretically naive 
statements in the literature like “we translate not 
words but culture” etc. The turns, the linguistic turn, 
the cultural turn, the ideological turn, the empirical 
turn, the power turn, and so on seem to me to be 
more superficial than substantial. They scratch 
surfaces  rather than plumb depths.  
In fact there is, I submit, nothing like ‘cultural 
translation’ as opposed to ‘linguistic translation’ 
simply because there are no ‘linguistic’ as opposed to 
‘cultural’ ways of looking at the universe! Are there 
examples of translations done keeping the ‘cultural 
turn’ in mind as opposed to the ‘linguistic turn’? 
There are NONE. More importantly, there can’t be 
any. Notice that this is not to deny the possible 
argument made below that knowledge-translation is 
less of a cultural phenomenon than literary 
translation. It is more of a culture-free, though not 
mechanical, human cognitive act. It is not mechanical 
because even cognitive texts are not fully self-
identical. They are not fully self-identical because 
human languages that they are made from are per se 
at some level specialised and native, though not 
exactly unique, evolutions of the human capacity to 
think and create mental worlds. But one ignores the 
nonself-identical characteristic of cognitive texts. As 
I wish to argue, neutrality is not an issue. Neutrality 
cannot be an issue in interlinguistic translation in so 
far as all acts of, and products of, human 
consciousness, as we said, should be decisional acts 
of ethical and rational responsibility.  Neutrality in 
the sense of not taking sides in a power struggle or a 
contest or a dispute or a war of words or weapons 
may not be the right way of looking at it.  
Do these turns exist in praxis, or are they exercises in 
airy precept?  
Who practised the ‘power turn’? Are there real-life 
examples of texts which were translated keeping the 
‘power turn’ in mind?...The point to make is that 
there are certain things that happen when the donor 
culture and the donee culture are in an asymmetrical 
equation. The nature of the translation could be, but 
not necessarily is, a function of the nature of the 
space that obtains between the source culture and the 
target culture. My own strong feeling is that this has 
been made too much of.  
13.0 KNOWLEDGE TRANSLATION VS 
LITERARY TRANSLATION  
Both knowledge-translation and literary translation 
make ‘global connectedness’ possible, but in ways 
that are crucially different. Arguably, knowledge 
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translation is culture-neutral while literary translation 
is typically a cultural phenomenon. Both meet when 
all translation is considered a decisional act of ethical 
responsibility, which follows the ideal that all writing 
in fact is, or ought to be, a decisional, life-enhancing, 
life-illuminating act of ethical responsibility and 
rational accountability.   
If one thinks of globalisation as a phenomenon, one 





the first two of the above could be argued to be 
necessary but are clearly NOT sufficient. It is the 
cultural and emotional, or human integration that is 
crucial for getting to the profound truism as worded 
by Jiddu Krishnamurthy:  
      “In every one of us is the rest of 
mankind.” 
13.1 Physical globalisation means shrinking of 
physical distance. Quick and efficient ease of access 
to physical places and to information and knowledge 
has truly shrunk the world. This could well be and, in 
fact is, salutary. Social networking sites have brought 
us humans together and have proved to be heartening 
catalysers of social change, as in the case of the Arab 
Spring 2011. They have led to human synergy in  the 
form of marriage across what seemed earlier 
insurmountable, if man-made, barriers.  Easy and 
efficient journeying, physical or virtual, to places 
other than one’s own, both physical and conceptual, 
deepens one’s idea of the world one lives in, and 
could deepen one’s idea of life-horizons and 
interhuman interfacial sites in ways that could lead 
one to the fourth and ultimate mode of globalisation 
enumerated above. Aside from these, physical and 
economic globalisation are basically driven by 
business. They of course do erase barriers of some 
kind, bringing humans together in terms of shared 
information, knowledge, and international capital 
flows and trade, but could typically keep intact 
spaces that continue to be seamed, impermeable, 
enclosed and sealed off. Knowledge translation 
belongs here. Supposing I read a Kannada translation 
of a Japanese book on paediatric audiology, or on 
prosthetic dental mechanics, I am the better for it. I 
would be truly thankful for the translation for two 
reasons: 
The medium or vector of translation would answer to 
something in my ontology:  mother-tongues, like 
mothers, answer to a need in one’s ontology. 
It would enrich me in an intimate, emotionally 
pleasant manner because of the reason at (a) above.  
But it need not, and does not, trigger waves of 
sympathy and synergy in me for the Japanese people 
and culture. I only get to have knowledge of 
something that was previously unavailable in my 
language. In other words,  the link that is forged 
when I read a knowledge translation is crucially and 
qualitatively different from the link that is forged 
when one reads a literary translation. Literature and 
literary translation touch one in an area of 
consciousness we as human beings share. That is 
precisely why they appeal to you and thereon drive 
you on to synergetic, even if heterogenising but 
healthily heterogenising, paths.  Original literature, 
unlike translation, is not interfacial.  As an interfacial 
site, where two different sociocultural ethoses meet, a 
whole lot of things can happen in translation within 
the constraints that this exposition has tried to draw 
the reader’s attention to.   
It is only literary translation that could humanise the 
speaking animal  across artificially seamed spaces by 
creating conditions that make real global 
connectedness possible. By allowing the local and the 
global to stand face to face, translation facilitates this. 
It is always by being rooted in and then by 
simultaneously transcending the local that we go 
global. One can’t go home to someone else’s parents, 
to some other village, to some other social group or 
nation. You don’t replace the local by the global. One 
must step into, through and go past the local before 
identifying oneself with the global. A situation where 
you are rooted in a global identity without first being 
oriented to a local identity and then transcending it is 
a highly advanced level of human consciousness,  a 
level that may be possible but rare.  Only meta-
normals and perhaps mentally unbalanced persons 
are in this situation. All creative literature does this, 
i.e. juxtapose the local with the global. It does it since
it has to because we humans are made that way. But
the point germane here is that translation does this
more interestingly because translation is now not
(seen as) an unproblematically ‘mechanical transfer
of determinate semantic cargo from one phonetic
vehicle to another’. A fully grown and evolved man
or group imbibing various perspectives that are
possible about mankind gotten through translations of
those ethoses is a step in becoming a cog in the wheel
of humanity. A perspective where one doesn’t look
down on the Other but looks over one’s shoulder at
the Other in a spirit of appreciative wonder, humility,
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equity and fellowship. The movement of colonial 
modernity that India experienced in the nineteenth 
century, we know, was because of translations from 
European and English authors. Literary translation is 
a site of cultural traffic, cultural give and take, a tool 
of cultural affirmation, a catalyst of change, of 
cultural interarticulation, an engine for synergy and 
growth, a cultural weapon or form of cultural 
contamination. This site is fraught with the positive 
possibilities of creating conditions whereby man sees 
himself as a trustee for the rest of creation by 
recognising in himself the local and the non-local, the 
personal and the transpersonal. This is the site where 
the local and global meet and emerge better for the 
meeting! One needs to identify the technical contours 
of this site in terms of its interdisciplinary dynamics, 
in terms of humankind’s situatedness on mother 
earth, in terms of human evolutionay enlightenment. 
Humankind hasn’t quite done this in a rigorously 
rational and exhaustive way. One  strong reason for 
this is that the dynamics of literary translation, unlike 
that of knowledge-translation, is more inductive than 
deductive. Arguably, while all sites of interlinguistic 
translation are sites of linguistic hospitality, that of 
knowledge-translation is more a case of linguistic 
ventriloquism. ‘Linguistic hospitality’, Brennan 
(Brennan 2007)tells us, means the world of ‘lived 
experience’ in the sense of Edmund Husserl and 
Martin  Heidegger’s lebenswelt and Jean Paul Sartre’ 
and Morris Merleau-Ponty’s le monde vecu. 
Linguistic hospitality is the experience every 
translator comes to live when she translates. She 
comes to feel, as we argued before, that natural 
languages in principle accommodate foreign 
meanings. As Ricouer puts it (Ricoeur 2006:10), 
“linguistic hospitality gives us a) the pleasure of 
dwelling in the other’s language and b) the pleasure 
of receiving the foreign word at home, in one’s own 
welcoming house.”   
Deleuzean view of translation applies only to the 
literary variety. As Levan (Levan 2007) puts it, “A 
Deleuzean philosophy of translation would not be 
concerned with origins or products (i.e., with faithful 
representation of one language in that of another) but 
with a style of interaction, a fluid orientation of 
approach rooted in an ontology of change.” I agree. A 
literary translation is of course rooted in concrete soil 
somewhere but it could grow off into an infinite 
expanse of the skies of change, evolution and 
enlightenment. The nonliterary kind is by definition 
limited in the short term but could be a brook, 
expanding the horizons of an ethos, but leading 
ultimately to this ocean of change, evolution and 
enlightenment. Knowledge-translation  of course has 
a place in the ontology of change.       
13.2 The translator, unlike the original author, has 
two ethoses, two world-views to look at, to contend 
with, to attend to. The mode of dealing with the co-
existing duality could be domesticating or 
foreignising,  manipulation, distortion, enrichment or 
impoverishment and so on --- to suit the target ethos 
or in pursuance of the translator’s agenda.  One of the 
best ways of putting in words what literary 
translation is about, or what literary translation can 
do, is stated by Hermans (2002): 
...Translation is of interest as a cultural phenomenon 
precisely because of its lack of neutrality or 
innocence, because of its density, its specific weight 
and added value. If it were merely a mechanical 
exercise, it would be as interesting as a photocopier. 
It is more interesting than a photocopier in that it 
presents us with a privileged index of cultural self-
preference, or if you prefer, self-definition. The 
practice of translation comprises the selection and 
importation of cultural goods from a outside a given 
circuit, and their transformation into terms which the 
receiving community can understand, if only in 
linguistic terms, and which it thus recognises, to 
some extent atleast as its own. And because each 
translation offers its own, overdetermined, distinct 
construction of the ‘otherness’ of the imported text, 
we can learn a great deal from these cultural 
constructions – and from the construction of the self 
that accompanies them. The paradigms and templates 
which a culture uses to build images of the foreign 
offer privileged insight into self-definition.       
I don’t however quite agree with the first sentence 
that Herman’s otherwise delightfully sublimely 
worded assertion begins with. Literary translation 
need not be prescriptively stubbornly anti-
essentialist, or be non-innocent or non-neutral as a 
precondition. That can’t be the defining feature of the 
site. An enriching churn, yes. A life-giving give-and-
take, yes. A change-inducing human effort, yes. But 
necessarily non-innocent?  Non-neutral?  ‘Innocence’ 
and ‘neutrality’ may not be the words to use.  It is 
possible for something to be ‘innocent’ but piquantly 
vibrantly intense and yet not be characterised by the 
mechanicality of a photocopy. I remember a 
multilogue in which I was a participant. Somebody 
was talking about a discussion that happened 
elsewhere, in which, he said, x messed up things. 
Somebody whose friend was the one who messed up 
things submitted in the instant multilogue that x was 
innocent, to which the man who said x messed up 
things, retorted, very relevantly:”am I not innocent?!” 
One could absorb all that is good and vibrant in any 
sociocultural ethos and when that kind of osmosis 
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happens, the question of neutrality could be 
supremely irrelevant. Cultural phenomena could be 
innocently, if piquantly, distinctive but operating well 
within the constraints that all human cultures are heir 
to, which were broached earlier in this essay. A 
dialogue could be innocent, piquant and non-
mechanical. I have Englished five Kannada pieces of 
creative fiction. In none of them did I adopt any 
agenda, wittingly or unwittingly. Unless one says 
interlinguistic translation is by definition agenda–
driven. This is the irrational and untenable extreme 
that colonial and postcolonial translation has taken 
translation to. This is not to say that I have done it 
mechanically either! Not at all. Interlinguistic 
intercultural translation is never mechanical. (One 
possible reason for this being that the original is not 
self-identical.) Nor is interlinguistic translation 
necessarily agenda-driven. We are thus envisioning 
the distinct possibility of a situation of non-agenda-
driven non-mechanical penetrative vibrancy, intensity 
and value-addedness. Knowledge-translation and 
literary translation could both be non-mechanical and 
non-agenda–driven. Where then are they different? 
Literary translation, unlike knowledge-translation, is 
a cultural transaction and is the site of a dialogue, the 
site of intercultural communication and osmosis. A 
dialogue could be innocent, piquant, non-mechanical, 
and value-added. The question of neutrality doesn’t 
necessarily arise in such a scenario. In fact neutrality, 
as we argue, is not an issue in so far as all products of 
human consciousness, including translation, are, or 
ought to be, decisional acts of rational and ethical 
responsibility. As argued here, neutrality in the sense 
of not taking sides in a power struggle, in a contest, 
dispute, war of weapons or words, may not be exactly 
right in the context of translation.      
The rest of the Hermans quote above is luminous in 
that the recontextualisation that translation is, is at the 
same time production and reproduction in the TL; a 
redoing of the world of the SL text mediated by the 
translating consciousness, which is a kaleidoscopic 
welter of things defining the self as against the Other, 
defining the self that is an incurably seamless part of 
a singulary human consciousness. On the other hand 
if the site of the original – the literary original rather 
than the discursive original - is itself plural, then the 
translation of this plurality could be that much more 
plural, given the unself-identicality of the original.     
13.3 Admittedly inductive, we are yet to fully realise 
what translation as a human enterprise can do, what it 
can potentiate, given the complex, varied and rich 
translation traditions in various speech communities 
around the world that are yet waiting to be unpacked. 
Some of these may not even be capable of being 
unearthed. There is for instance no knowing the  
difference between the state of affairs that reading  
authors like Dostoevsky in translation, which most of us 
Indians did, and in the original, may result in.   
13.4 Another huge desideratum in the translation  
academia, as stated already, is the elucidation of the 
dynamics, mechanics and the source of the nonself-
identicality of the transcendent  literary originals. 
Attempted discourses in this direction are bubbles  
floating in the air!      
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